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Abstract 
Large sunk cost of development, negligible cost of reproduction and distribution and substantial 
economies of scale make information goods distinct from industry goods. In this paper, we analyze 
versioning strategies of horizontally differentiated information goods with shared feature sets, discrete 
hierarchical groups and continuous individual consumer tastes. Based on our modelling results, when 
cannibalization is considered among different market segments, it is always sub-optimal to 
differentiate information goods if market is not fully differentiated or characteristics of the 
information goods are not specifically designed to relate to certain market segments. 
 
Keywords: Product Line Design, Versioning Strategies, Information Goods, Cannibalization 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Information goods such as computer software, online services, online content and digitalized music, 
movies and books have become an indispensable part of our life. The greatest distinction between 
information goods and physical goods is reproduction costs where the former incurs large sunk costs 
of development but negligible costs of reproduction and distribution. Broad adoption of e-commerce, 
secure and convenient online payments and high-speed Internet connections have greatly lowered 
transaction costs and made information goods more appealing. In addition to production costs, several 
other features make information goods different from other products: due to developments in software 
engineering, characteristics of information goods can be easily recombined to generate different 
versions (Varian 1998). Typical versioning examples include Microsoft Windows series (XP, Vista 
and 7), Norton anti-virus software, SAS and Matlab packages, among others.  
Although it is technically possible for firms to generate a ``super-version" which contains all the 
characteristics in their product line and then degrade it to generate vertically differentiated versions, 
many firms still choose to differentiate their products horizontally whenever possible. Indeed, previous 
research has shown that a monopolist offering vertically differentiated versions is optimal only under 
some restrictive conditions (Wu, Chen and Anandalingam 2003, Chen and Seshadri 2007, Bhargava 
and Choudhary 2008). In this work, we treat vertical differentiation as a special case of horizontal 
differentiation, and model the interaction between different market segments showing how and when 
monopoly versioning is optimal. 
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of the Complete Product Line Design Approach 
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A complete versioning solution includes both technical and business validations, as illustrated in 
Figure 1 (Ullah and Wei 2010). In this paper we only focus on the business side, assuming that all the 
technical problems have been solved. The information goods monopolist is free to choose various 
combinations of features to generate different versions for different consumer segments. 
Essential to our model is the definition of an individual consumer taste for quality, and a group taste 
that is correlated with individual tastes. In the real world, we normally observe that consumers with 
similar preference for certain products are aggregated in groups, which is also regarded as market 
segments. We find that if there is only one group, then the classic result of no versioning - that is, a 
single version - found by others, holds. For multiple groups and horizontally differentiated information 
goods we provide an intuitive condition that results in no cross-purchasing, and consequently a 
monopolist offers a separate version for each group. Relaxing the no cross-purchasing condition, we 
find that versioning can still be optimal with the monopolist squeezing lower-taste groups in favor of 
higher taste and more profitable groups. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We set up our notation and assumptions in Section 2 and 
analyze the optimization model of an information good monopolist when there are multiple groups 
with horizontally differentiated goods in Section 3. Discussion and future research are included in 
Section 4. 
2 MODELING 
Following the hedonic hypothesis that “goods are valued for their utility-bearing attributes or 
characteristics” (Rosen 1974), we define information goods as a set of characteristics. We allow for M 
characteristics, },,,{ 21 Mxxx L=χ , and each good contains a subset of these characteristics, for 
example, },,,{ 21 IXXX L⊇χ where there are I possible information goods. Quality is denoted by q 
where ),0[ ∞+∈q . We assume that complexity of information goods does not jeopardize their 
quality levels and that unused characteristics can be freely disposed of or ignored in use. In other 
words, the quality of information goods are solely determined by the set of characteristics they include, 
and more characteristics are better. This is our first assumption. 
Assumption 1 For two information goods  iX and jX , if ji XX ⊆ , then ji qq ≤ . 
If an information good contains all the characteristics of another good and more, then we call it 
“vertical differentiation”. If two information goods do not include each other, then we call it 
“horizontal differentiation”. Our Assumption 1 indicates that quality can be compared between 
vertically differentiated goods. For horizontally differentiated goods, quality cannot be compared 
directly. As in most prior research, we take consumers to be heterogeneous and continuously 
distributed in their individual taste for quality. We denote the individual consumer taste as θ  which 
belongs to ],[ 0 Nθθ . We assume that θ  has density and cumulative density functions )(θf  and )(θF , 
so that consumers are normalized with a unit population. The density is strictly positive over its 
support and continuously differentiable. Following Bhargava and Choudhary (2001), Jing (2002) and 
Sundararajan (2004), we make the following assumption about the distribution of consumer taste:  
Assumption 2 The reciprocal of the hazard function, 
( ) ( )( )θ
θθϕ
f
F-1=
, is non-increasing inθ . 
This assumption is satisfied by common distributions such as the uniform, normal, logistic, chi-
squared, exponential, and Laplace distributions, and any distribution with increasing density 
（Bhargava and Choudhary， 2001）.  
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Essential to our model, we define a second feature that determines an individual's taste for quality: a 
group taste. Consumers are divided into groups and these groups are correlated with individual tastes 
which in turn define segments. Consumers with individual taste in segment [ )nn θθ ,1−  belong to 
group n , { }Nn ,,2,1 L∈ . Consumers in the same group n share the same group taste nk  and higher 
groups have greater tastes for quality, which means nn kk >+1 . We represent the taste for quality as a 
product of the individual and group taste so that it can be represented by θnk . Without a great loss of 
generality (as we can rescale q), we assume a multiplicative relationship in the consumers' willingness 
to pay ( )nkqU ,,θ  between taste θnk  and quality q . This is our third assumption. 
Assumption 3 The utility function of consumers in group n  who purchase information good with 
quality q  is expressed as ( ) qkkqU nn θθ =,, , { }Nn ,,2,1 L∈ , ∈θ [ )nn θθ ,1− . 
To provide a separate version for certain consumers may incur additional costs which we refer to as 
“versioning costs”. Versioning costs could include additional development, marketing and managerial 
costs. Technology development such as software engineering has greatly lowered additional 
development costs for versioning and broad adoption of e-commerce has minimized additional 
marketing and managerial costs for providing an extra version. In this paper, we assume that 
versioning costs are zero after the highest quality information goods have been produced. 
Following the individual-rationality constraint (Sundararajan 2004), in segment n  where the 
consumer only chooses between purchasing the good designed for their segment and not purchasing, 
we define nθ
~
 as the indifferent consumer and the price assignment is 
( )nnnn kqUp ,~,θ=                                                                                                                                (1) 
Following the incentive-compatibility constraint (Sundararajan 2004), in segment n  where the 
consumer chooses between purchasing the good designed for their segment n  and a good designed for 
another segment i , we define nθ
~
 as the indifferent consumer and the price assignment is 
( ) ( ).,~,,~, nninnnin kqUkqUpp θθ −+=                                                                                              (2) 
In this formulation, the profit maximization problem for a monopolist that serves all N  segments 
is
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −=Π ∑=
N
n
nnnN FFp
NN 1
~,,~
1~,,~
~~,,~ maxmax
11
θθθθ
θθθθ LL
L
              [ )nnn θθθ ,~ 1−∈ . 
3 VERSIONING STRATEGIES WITH CROSS-PURCHASE 
When there is no group taste parameter to differentiate different market segments (e.g. there is only 
one segment in the market), previous research (Bhargava and Choudhary 2001, Jones and Mendelson 
2005, Jing 2002 and Wu, Chen and Anandalingam 2003) shows that it is not optimal to version 
information goods. Using our formulation we also replicate their findings. 
Now we extend our basic model to include group tastes for different segments. For a horizontally 
differentiated market, consumers from different groups derive value from a shared set of 
characteristics of the information good, while other characteristics can be tailored to provide value for 
different groups. We use aX  to denote the shared characteristics and aq  as the quality index for aX . 
Based on the product line engineering, different versions within a product line normally share a 
common, managed set of characteristics (Birk, Heller, John, von der Maben, Muller and Schmid, 
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2003). For simplicity, we assume that aX  is the only set of characteristics shared by the different 
goods in the product line, that is jiXXX jia ≠∀∩= , . As a result we have the following utility 
function 
( )
⎩⎨
⎧=
,
,
,,
an
in
ni qk
qk
kqU θ
θθ
  if
if
 ;
;
in
in
≠
=
 
which means if a consumer from group n  purchases the information good tailored for group n ,then 
the consumer receives utility nn qk θ . Otherwise, if a consumer purchases the “wrong” information 
good (one tailored for another group), the consumer only gets utility from the shared characteristics, 
an qk θ . Therefore, our definition of horizontal differentiation is this form where the additional 
characteristics that each group values are mutually exclusive. 
To avoid cross-purchase, which in this case means avoiding consumers preferring the “wrong” 
information good, the following conditions apply, which means as far as the highest group does not 
cross-purchase, then cross-purchase can be safely avoided. 
{ }1,,2,1,*
*
−∈∀≤ Nn
k
k
q
q
NN
nn
n
a Lθ
θ
, 
where 
*
nθ  is the indifferent consumer when the monopolist maximizes profit in segment n  only. 
When there is no cross-purchase, each consumer groups can be safely treated as an independent 
market segment and it is straightforward that the monopolist provides each segment one version which 
is tailored for it. 
Now we analyze the conditions where there is cross-purchase. Generally, for customer group i , if we 
have 
Nji
k
k
q
q
jj
ii
i
a ≤<≤> 1,*
*
θ
θ
, which means 
*
jθ  gets more value from aq  than *jθ  gets from iq , 
then there is potential threat for part of market segment j  who will purchase good iX  instead of jX . 
So how does the producer deal with this problem? To better address this problem, we further assume 
N
aaa
q
q
q
q
q
q ==== L
21
λ
, which means the comparable quality of the different versions offered for 
each market segment is the same. Now we can see that if
*
11
*
11
*
*
11
−−
≤<
NNNN k
k
k
k
θ
θλθ
θ
, then cross 
purchasing only occurs between market segment 1 and market segment N  (Since market 1-N  are 
prevented from cross purchasing, all the lower market segments are also prevented from purchasing 
goods designed for segment 1). Here we limit the interaction within two market segments to better 
illustrate the interactions. Results from the analysis of market 1 and N  can be generalized to the 
analysis of any two market segments i  and j . 
Under the threat of cross purchasing between market segment 1 and market segment N , the 
information good producer will now change the price constraints in both market segments N  and 1. 
We denote Nθ
~
 the indifferent type for market segment N  who is indifferent between buying good 
5
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NX  and 1X  and 1
~θ  the indifferent type for market segment 1 who is indifferent between buying good 
1X  and not buying. Then the price constraints are as follow: 
1111
~ qkp θ= , [ )101 ,~ θθθ ∈                                                                                                                    (3) 
and 
1
~~ pqkpqk aNNNNNN −=− θθ ,  for [ )NN θθθ ,~ 11 −∈                                                                         (4) 
In the market segment N , there is another indifferent type which we denote as customer type Nθ ′ , who 
is indifferent between buying 1X  and not buying. And we have the following additional relationship 
111
~ qkqk aNN θθ =′ , for ]
~,[ 1 NNN θθθ −∈′                                                                                               (5) 
Based on the constraints of Nθ ′  , we have 
},
~
max{ 1
111
−=′ n
aN
N qk
qk θθθ
 since NN θθ
~≤′  can always be 
satisfied. Here we have three possible customer groups. Customers in ],
~[ 11 θθ  who buy 1X , customers 
in ]
~,[ NN θθ ′  who buy 1X  and customers in ],
~[ NN θθ  who buy NX . Customers in ]
~,[ NN θθ ′  are market 
encroachment of good 1X  in market for NX . Note that in this situation, λ
a
N
q
qq ==1
. Substitute the 
same price relationship equations (3) and (4) into the profit maximization model, we get: 
))}~(1(1~))(1)~()((~)~,~({ 11111~,~max1 NaNNN
a
N FqkFFF
q
k
N
θλ
λθθθθλθθθθθ −
−+′−+−=Π  
Subject to 
[ )101 ,~ θθθ ∈ , ],[~ 1 NNN θθθ −∈ , },
~
max{ 1111 −=′ N
aN
N qk
qk θθθ
 
From the first order conditions with respect to Nθ
~
, we have, )
~(
)~(1~
*
*
*
N
N
N f
F
θ
θθ −=
 
Solve the above equation we get
**~
NN θθ =  , which means the market share for good NX  is the same as 
without the threat of good 1X . However, the profit of good NX  decreases because the price has to be 
lowered to maintain the same market share. 
Now we come to the market share for good 1X  in market segment 1 and there are two situations. 
1. If market segment N  is already covered by NX , or if we have
1
111
~
−≤ N
aN qk
qk θθ
, which means market 
segment N  is jointly covered by NX  and 1X , then we have 1−=′ nN θθ . The first order condition with 
respect to 1
~θ  is: 
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)~(
)(1)~()(~
*
1
1
*
11*
1 θ
θθθθ
f
FFF N−−+−=
 
Since )(
)()(
)(
)(1)()( 111
θ
θθ
θ
θθθ
f
FF
f
FFF N −>−+− −
, we get 
*
1
*
1
~ θθ > . Note that in this case, market 
segment N  is covered. It can be covered by good NX  alone or by both NX  and 1X . 
2. If market segment N  is not covered. We have 
*111
1
~
N
aN
N qk
qk θθθ <<−
. Then we get aN
N qk
qk 111
~θθ =′
. 
The first order conditions with respect to 1
~θ  is: 
λθθ
θθθθ
N
N
N
k
kff
FFF
1*
1
*
11*
1
)()~(
)(1)~()(~
′+
′−+−=
 
Since function )(
-1
θ
θ
f
F ）（
 is non-increasing, we have, 
*
1*
*
11*
1
*
1
*
*
11 )(
)(1
)(
)(1 θθ
θθλθθ
θλ
λθ
θ =>=−≥
′
′−
NN
N
N
N
N
N
NN
N
N
N
k
k
k
k
k
k
f
F
k
k
k
kf
F
 
And 
*
1θ  is the solution for )(
)()( 1
θ
θθθ
f
FF −=
. So we have
*
1
*
1
~ θθ > . 
So under both conditions we have
*
1
*
1
~ θθ > , which means the producer shrinks its market share for 
good 1X  in segment 1 to maximize its overall profit. And the higher 
*
1
~θ  can also make the price of 
good 1X  and NX  relatively higher. 
And we can expect that with the increase ofλ , cross purchasing happens between market segment 1 
and 1−N . There will be more incentive for firm to increase *1
~θ , and finally it will reach the point 
that 2
*
1
~ θθ ≥ . Then firm finds it better to close its sales for goods 1X  in market segment 1 to maintain 
the high profit in its high-end market segments. When λ  is close to one, most of the low-end markets 
are closed and only a few high-end markets retain. 
We generalize the analysis above to develop the following theorem of versioning strategies: 
Theorem 1 
1. If there is only one consumer group, then it is not optimal to version information goods. 
2. With multiple consumer groups, if there is no threat of cross-purchasing, then the monopolist to 
provide each segment with one version which is tailored for it. 
3. For market with multiple groups and differentiated goods with shared characteristics, if there is 
threat of cross-purchase, the monopolist retains the market share of version designed for the high-end 
market in its own market segment while shrinking the market share of the low-end market until it is 
totally closed. 
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4 DISCUSSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
There is interesting comparison if we treat market segment 1 and N  separately. Without considering 
profit from market segment 1 (we may suppose market segment 1 and market segment N  are 
managed separately), the profit maximization problem takes the following form where we denote NΠ  
the profit for market segment N  
))}~(1)(~1~()~({ 11~max NaaNNNN F
qkqk
n
θλθλ
λθθ
θ
−+−=Π                ],[
~
1 NNN θθθ −∈  
The first order condition is: 
)1(
~
)~(
)~(1~ 11
λ
θ
θ
θθ −−
−=
NN
N
N k
k
f
F
 
We can see that if market segment N  is not covered without threat of cross purchasing )( 1
*
−> NN θθ , 
then we can always have
**~
NN θθ > . It means the producer has incentive to expand its market share in 
the high-end market under threat of cross purchasing. The reason why the producer retains its market 
share in its high-end market while considering the profit in both market is because firm can get 
compensation from the sales of 1X  in market segment N . 
The profit maximizing problem for segment 1 is: 
))}()~()~()((~)~({ *111111~max
1
NN
a FFFFqk θθθθλθθθ ′−+−=Π  
[ )101 ,~ θθθ ∈ , },
~
max{ 1
111
−=′ N
aN
N qk
qk θθθ
 
There are three situations that can result: 
1. If market segment N  is already covered by NX , then we have 1
*~
−==′ NNN θθθ . The first order 
conditions with respect to 1
~θ  is: 
)~(
)~()(~
*
1
*
11*
1 θ
θθθ
f
FF −=
 
Obviously we have
*
1
*
1
~ θθ = , which means if segment N  is already covered by good NX , then there 
is no incentive for segment 1 to change its optimal arrangement. 
2. If market segment N  is not covered by good NX , but it is jointly covered by goods NX  and 1X , 
we have 
*
1
~
NNN θθθ <=′ − . The first order conditions with respect to 1~θ  is: 
)~(
)()~()~()(~
*
1
1
**
11*
1 θ
θθθθθ
f
FFFF NN −−+−=
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Since 0)()
~( 1
* >− −NN FF θθ , we get *1*1~ θθ > . It means in this situation, segment 1 shrinks in its own 
market segment while encroaching on segment N . 
3. If market segment N  is not covered by good NX , and it is also not covered by both goods NX  
and 1X , we have 
*111
1
~
N
aN
N qk
qk θθθ <<−
. Then we get aN
N qk
qk 111
~θθ =′
. The first order conditions with 
respect to 1
~θ  is: 
λθθ
θθθθθ
N
N
NN
k
kff
FFFF
1*
1
**
11*
1
)()~(
)()~()~()(~
′+
′−+−=
 
In this condition it is uncertain whether market share of good 1X  in segment 1 expands or shrinks. It 
will depend on the relative value ofλ , 1k  and Nk . We use the following numerical example to show 
this. 
A Numerical Example. 
In a situation where there are only two segments, we make 1,125.0,0 210 === θθθ . Customers are 
uniformly distributed so that 1)(,)( == θθθ fF . We can easily get *1θ  = 0:063 and *2θ  = 0:5. 
If  λ = 0.125, 1k  = 1 and 2k  = 2, we can calculate that *1~θ  = 0.061 < *1θ , *2~θ  = 0.483 < *2θ  and 2θ ′  = 
0.243. All constraints are satisfied. 
If λ  = 0.25, 1k  = 1 and 2k  = 2, we can calculate that *1~θ  = 0.099 > *1θ , *2~θ  = 0.467 < *2θ  and 2θ ′  = 
0.197. All constraints are satisfied. 
 
Segment j Optimal  Separately Jointly 
Covered by j
X
 
*
iθ  Same Increase
*
jθ  Same Same 
Covered by j
X
 and iX  
*
iθ  Increase Increase
*
jθ  Decrease Same 
Not Covered *
iθ  Uncertain Increase
*
jθ  Decrease Same 
Table 2 Market Encroachment between Market Segments  i  and  j  ( i<j ) 
 
Note: 
Increase means shrinkage of market share in the market segment; 
Decrease means expansion of market share in the market segment. 
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There are two extreme situations for product with shared characteristics. One is that the common 
quality aq  is zero, which is the perfect quality differentiation situation we discussed in the previous 
section. The other extreme is that the special quality is zero, which means hq = aq , customers in 
different groups value all the characteristics of the information good, although at different utility level, 
which returns to the vertical differentiation model. 
5 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we investigated conditions that determine when an information goods monopolist 
chooses to implement versioning strategies. We showed that versioning strategies are implemented 
only when different groups of consumers can be clearly defined. In other words, versioning cannot be 
used to segment a market; rather, versioning strategies must fit the existing market segments. Our 
optimal versioning strategies are in accordance with Shapiro and Varian's (1999) suggestion that 
versions should be designed to accentuate the differences between groups in their tastes. We 
demonstrated that in a horizontally differentiated market, if there is no cross-purchase, then it is 
optimal to provide one version for each segment. Otherwise, the monopolist shrinks the market in the 
lower-end segment to protect profits in the higher-end segments. 
Our contribution lies in two aspects. First, although most of the previous research (Bhargava and 
Choudhary 2001, 2008, Jones and Mendelson 2008, Jing 2002 and Wu, Chen and Anandalingam 2003) 
focuses on vertical differentiation, we treat information goods as a combination of characteristics so 
that we link horizontal differentiation with vertical differentiation. In our model, we made a transition 
from horizontal differentiation to vertical differentiation and showed how versioning strategies change 
during the transition. Second, we introduced a group taste to successfully explain the existence of 
multiple versions. Much of the previous research (Bhargava and Choudary 2001, Jones and 
Mendelson 2005) using linear utility without group tastes found only one version is optimal. 
There are several limitations in our modeling framework. Our modeling results are based on 
assumptions such as linear utility and a positive relationship between group taste and individual taste. 
In addition, the introduction of hierarchical characteristics explains versioning in vertical 
differentiation, but we recognize that it is a special preference structure. Future research may relax 
some of these assumptions, and can address additional issues. 
In addition, our paper studies monopoly versioning strategies. Although real world examples show 
that many information goods markets are “winner-take-all” markets where only one provider 
dominates, we expect that competition (Jones and Mendelson 2011, Wei and Nault 2006) has the 
potential to make a significant difference in these strategies. 
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